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Municipal zoning has come a long way in a short time. Once
the unwanted child of the courts, municipal zoning has become a
modern Goliath.
As a practical matter, the local zoning board of today is subject
to no review in the exercise of its authority. The desirable objects
of public health, safety and the general welfare, which have been
the traditional limits of municipal police power have proved to be
elastic concepts in the hands of municipal planners.
The result is that zoning power 'has been widely abused. Many
cities have found that zoning can accomplish some of the natural
objects of eminent domain, such as preservation of open spaces,
without the necessity of compensation. Many other cities have found
that zoning can accomplish exclusionary objectives which would
fail constitutionally if attempted by any other means.
However, the courts have begun stepping into the void. Particu-
larly in the urban states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the courts
have begun the task of defining the outer limits of municipal zoning.
This article will attempt to define those limits and to discern their
underlying rationales.
North Dakota has as yet few of the problems which have resulted
in restrictive and exclusionary zoning in more urban areas. But
the seeds have been planted. Just as North Dakota's principal cities
are now facing the problems of urban blight and redevelopment,
which were once exclusively metropolitan, they will in the future
also face problems similar to those which led to the zoning abuses
documented in this article. The police power and zoning in particular
present cheap and expedient solutions to many urban problems.
* B.S., 1969; University of Minnesota, J.D., 1972, University of Minnesota. partner in the
firm of Zuger & Bucklin, Bismarck, North Dakota,
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ZONING
Zoning is a relatively modern addition to the scope of police
power in the United States. Like building codes, zoning is derived
from the inherent police power of the state. Therefore, the earliest
zoning laws were directed, against clear dangers to the public health
and safety, in large part codifying aspects of the common law of
nuisance.
The earliest zoning laws regulated the use of property to protect
against noxious odors, uses dangerous to the public health and
similarly clear-cut objects of the police power. Regulations of this
nature were widely enacted and generally upheld by the courts.
However, they were not comprehensive in nature, but aimed at
specific problems like slaughter-houses or stables.'
As the cities continued to grow in the early years of this century,
it became apparent that piecemeal legislation aimed at specific
uses was not going to be sufficient to meet the need for orderly
growth and development of the cities. In 1914 the state of New York
enacted the first zoning enabling act at the behest of the city of
New York.2 This was followed in 1916 by the enactment by the
city of New York of the first comprehensive zoning ordinance,
dividing the entire city into various use districts, each carefully
detailed as to permitted uses.3
Following the enactment of New York's 1916 zoning ordinance,
comprehensive zoning ordinances were adopted across the country,
meeting varying degrees of acceptance in the courts. In Georgia,
Texas, Colorado, Maryland and Missouri comprehensive zoning or-
dinances were invalidated on the grounds that they amounted to a
public appropriation of private property without compensation, in
violation of the 5th amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
4
Ten years after the adoption of New York's zoning ordinance
the issue reached the United States Supreme Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5 The village of Euclid, a suburb of
Cleveland, enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1922. This
ordinance divided the village into building zones based on use,
height and area. The ordinance provided six districts in which
uses were regulated to varying extents, with the lower zones includ-
ing all uses permitted by the higher zones. Even in the lowest
use zone, certain enumerated uses were entirely prohibited. The
1. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 2.03, 2.06 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
R. ANDERSON].
2. LAWS (New York 1914), ch. 470.
3. Building Zone Ordinance (City of New York 1916).
t. R. ANDERSON, supra, § 2.08.
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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ordinance also provided for maximum building heights and mini-
mum lot areas, depending upon the location in the village.
The plaintiff, Ambler Realty, sought to have the ordinance
declared unconstitutional in that it deprived the company of a por-
tion of the value of its property without compensation and was
therefore in violation of the 5th amendment as applied to the states
by section 1 of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The plaintiff's land had been placed in U-2, U-3 and U-6 use
zones by the ordinance. U-2 permitted only single family and duplex
dwellings. U-3 also permitted apartment buildings, hotels, churches,
schools and public buildings, as well as U-2 uses. U-6 permitted
most industrial uses as well as all higher uses. Ambler Realty
introduced evidence showing that while the land zoned U-2 was
worth $10,000 per acre for industrial uses, its value for residential
use was only $2500 per acre. It contended that this amounted to
an unlawful confiscation of value without any relation to the health
or safety needs of the community.
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance. It viewed the central
issue to be the reasonableness of exclusion of business uses from
residential areas. It ruled that this was a legitimate object of the
police power because of the detrimental effect that business uses
have upon residential areas. The Court pointed to the increased
traffic, disorder, noise and fire hazard inherent in business develop-
ment. The same argument was applied to the exclusion of apart-
ments from residential areas.
It is important to note that the Court decided only that com-
prehensive zoning is not unconstitutional per se and did not attempt
to define the lawful limits of the zoning power:
The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the
illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions. A
regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid
as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as
applied to rural communities. In solving doubts, the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foun-
dation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily
will furnish a fairly helpful clew."
The Court observed that the requirements of public welfare
had changed drastically in the years preceding its opinion and
that they would change in the future as well. Thus Euclid v. Ambler
stands for the principle that public welfare is an elastic concept,
to be stretched and fitted to the changing environment.
6. Id. at 387.
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Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid, judicial
opposition to comprehensive zoning virtually disappeared and zoning
proceeded far beyond the dictates of public health and safety.
Today at least one court, Hawaii, apparently considers pure
aesthetics to be sufficient justification for the exercise of the police
power through zoning. In State of Hawaii v. Diamond Motors,
Inc.,7 the Supreme Court of Hawaii said:
We accept beauty as a proper community objective, at-
tainable through the use of police power. . . Hawaii's con-
stitution provides: 'The State shall have power to conserve
and develop its natural beauty, objects and places of historic
or cultural interest, sightliness and physical good order, and
for that purpose private property shall be subject to reason-
able regulation.'
This decision was heralded as a "splendid' decision" and as
"indicative of the forward thinking judicial approach" by Fred G.
Stickel, III, Chairman of the Committee of Zoning and Planning
for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) in
his 1968 annual report to the Institute. 9 In his report of the following
year, Mrs. Stickel noted that aesthetics did not seem any longer
to be disputed as a legitimate object of zoning.10
III. THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The result of such broad judicial sanction of zoning, 'however,
has been the enactment of restrictive or exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances in many municipalities. Municipal zoning boards, seeing
the public welfare as a product of the demands of their own
constituencies, have often zoned out what they consider to be un-
desirable persons or uses, with little regard for the regional impact
of their action.
The young, the poor and the semi-transient have often found
it inordinately expensive to find housing because of housing short-
ages in the central cities, while land zoned for single family units,
often with substantial minimum lot requirements, lies vacant in
the suburbs.
A study of zoning in Westchester prepared by Robert M. Ander-
son shows the extent of exclusionary zoning in the suburbs." The
study shows that in the 16 towns in Westchester County (containing
most of the undeveloped land in the county), 99 per cent of the
7. 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
8. Id. at 827.
9. 81 NIMIO Mun. L. Rev. 346 (1968).
10. 32 NIMLO Mun. L. Rev. 421 (1969).
11. Anderson, Introduction, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 465, 468 n. 1 (1971).
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residentially zoned land is restricted to single family dwellings.
Seven of the sixteen towns make no provision for multi-family build-
ings. Only one of the towns permits mobile homes. Row houses and
town houses are excluded from all of the towns. Of the land zoned
residential in Westchester towns, 52.6 per cent is zoned for a mini-
mum lot size of two acres or more and 82 per cent for 30,000 square
feet or more (3 of an acre). About half of the towns even set a min-
imum floor area for any homes which are built.
A study by the Regional Plan Association shows that exclusion-
ary zoning is widespread and not just the pattern in a few suburbs.1 2
The study surveys more than 500 zoning jurisdictions in the New York
metropolitan area. Outside of New York City itself, 99.6 per cent
of the available residential property was zoned for single family
dwellings only.
The results of exclusionary zoning in the nation's urban areas are
obvious. Under the guise of public welfare, the suburbs have erected
walls around the cities. Those persons who are unable to afford a
single family dwelling, a large lot and a large house are trapped in
the central city, where noise, crowded housing and low tax base ag-
gravate their condition. Clearly, the effect is to aggravate the prob-
lems of public health, safety and general welfare that zoning is in-
tended to ameliorate.
North Dakota also has zoning problems to which many cases
cited in this article may be relevant.
In a metropolitan area zoning problems often arise when neigh-
boring cities zone for divergent, even conflicting purposes. In North
Dakota a similar conflict often results when city and county, or per-
haps township and township, zone for differing or conflicting pur-
poses. It is not unusual, for instance, for a county to allow a detri-
mental use adjacent to a city. No doubt the converse also occurs.
The difference is that North Dakota's urban problems appear
on a smaller scale and in a different context. Nevertheless, they are
basically the same problems and they present many of the same
legal questions as the cases examined in this article.
IV. THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION TO EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The Supreme Court in Euclid recognized that zoning could create
as well as solve problems. Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the opinion
of the Court, noted that there would be "cases where the general
public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munici-
12. REPORT OF U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON UREAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME,. at 140
(1969).
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pality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way."'1
Today, zoning practices which have gone unquestioned in an
earlier time of more abundant resources and less crowded environ-
ment are coming under fire in the courts of the more urban states,
notably in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania. These courts are in-
creasingly viewing minimum lot restrictions, minimum floor area
restrictions, multi-family building restrictions and mobile home
restrictions as exclusionary in nature and no longer reasonable today.
Exclusionary zoning has been subjected to increasing attack
in recent years both from landowners and from persons who have
been excluded from communities as a result of it.1.
The standing of the landowner to sue is grounded upon the 5th
amendment prohibition against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation and upon due process clause
of the 14th amendment which has since 1897 included the 5th
amendment prohibition against the taking of private property. 15 The
right of a person excluded from a community to sue is based upon
the 14th amendment equal protection clause.
As might be expected, the landowner suit developed first and
has achieved greater recognition and success in the courts than has
the equal protection suit by the excluded person, often a non-citizen
and a non-taxpayer of the municipality. However, despite the fact
that the two causes of action are independently derived from the
Constitution, both are primarily concerned with the concept that the
public health, safety and general welfare are necessary validating
factor in any zoning regulation. Thus, the equal protection argu-
ment often proceeds from the same premises as does the uncom-
pensated taking argument and its development, though less exten-
sive, has been similar.
Be that as it may, this article deals only with the subject of
zoning reasonableness from the standpoint of the landowner.
As already noted, Euclid v. Ambler stands for the proposition
that in order for a zoning ordinance not to amount to an uncompen-
sated public taking of private property, it must bear a reasonable
relation to the public health, safety or general welfare. Euclid v.
Ambler, however, did not attempt to define this elusive concept or
place limits on it.
In the cases which follow, at least criteria appear by which
courts can and do judge the reasonableness of zoning ordinances.
13. 272 U.S. at 390.
14. For an analysis of exclusionary zoning from the standpoint of the excluded individual
see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STANFORD L. REv. 767 (1968).
15. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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Firstly, a zoning ordinance may be invalidated if it bears no reason-
able relation to the advancement of the public health, safety or wel-
fare. The courts, of course, vary widely in their definitions of pub-
lic health, safety and general welfare. Secondly, an ordinance may
also be invalidated if it prohibits a proper land use for which no
provision has been made elsewhere in the economic community.
Thirdly, an ordinance may be struck down because it unreasonably
permits a use detrimental to pre-existing uses in the area. Finally,
a zoning ordinance may be invalidated if it results in an excessive
dimunition of property value, even though there is a resulting com-
munity benefit.
V. THE OVERLYING CONSIDERATION OF REGIONAL NEEDS
In applying these four factors, the courts are increasingly view-
ing the facts of each case in, the context of the economic community,
rather than the legally-defined municipality. Courts are imposing
a duty upon the municipality to take into consideration uses and
trends beyond its boundaries in formulating a zoning scheme.
In Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,6 the court re-
jected the contention of the borough of Dumont that it was under
no obligation to zone in harmony with existing uses in three neigh-
boring boroughs. The borough of Dumont had re-zoned, from resi-
dential to business, a parcel of land facing exclusively single-family
residential areas in the boroughs of Haworth, Cresskill and Demarest.
The court in Cresskill v. Dumont held that Dumont was under
a duty to consider not only the the impact of the proposed change
upon the neighboring municipalities, but also the need for any addi-
tional business areas, based upon the availability of business sites
in all four boroughs. The New Jersey enabling statute provided that
zoning "shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. .... "IT
The court felt that in order to be comprehensive a plan must be re-
gional in scope.
In rejecting Dumont's contention that its only duty was to itself
and its citizens, the court said:
or such a view might prevail where there are large un-
developed areas at the borders of two contiguous towns, 'but
it cannot be tolerated where, as here, the area is built up
and one cannot tell when one is passing from one borough
to another. . . .At the very least Dumont owes a duty to
hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities
who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes
and to give as much consideration to their rights as they
16. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
17. N.J. RIEv. STAT., 40:55-52 (1937).
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would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont.18
(emphasis added.)
The regional philosophy of zoning is anything but entrenched,
even in New Jersey. In Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester
Township,19 the New Jersey court declined to follow its holding in
Creskill v. Dumont to its logical conclusion. In that case, the court
upheld a community-wide ban on mobile homes in a municipality
which permitted business, industrial and agricultural uses, despite
a regional shortage of mobile home space.
The court in Vickers apparently defined the general welfare to
exclude regional considerations. The majority opinion said that "[i]f
the zoning ordinance is reasonably calculated to advance the com-
munity as a social, economic and political unit, it furthers the gen-
eral welfare and therefore is a proper exercise of the zoning pow-
er.,,
20
The court's opinion was countered, though, by a strong and well-
reasoned dissent by Justice Hall, who argued that Cresskill v. Du-
mont and the earlier case of Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Bor-
ough of Cresskill2l were controlling on the "proposition that the 'gen-
eral welfare' transcends the artificial limits of political subdivi-
sions .... ,,22
Regionalism has also been cited as a factor in zoning decisions
in other states. It has been relied upon in zoning cases both to invali-
date and to uphold zoning ordinances by the highest court in Illinois,
Missouri, Pennylvania, Maryland, Virginia and in the Court of Ap-
peals for the 6th Circuit.23
Regionalism is a judicial gloss applied by the courts to give
more or less scope to their consideration of the basic reasonable-
ness of zoning. It is often cited when an ordinance is disapproved,
it is often ignored when an ordinance is approved. The four criteria
discussed below, however, go to the heart of the question of reason-
ableness. They are the controlling factors in the cases.
VI. LACK OF REASONABLE PUBLIC PURPOSE
The first of these factors determining reasonableness is the de-
gree of relation to the ordinance to the objects of public health, safety
and general welfare. Since the advancement of these objects formed
the grounds upon which the Court affirmed the legality of compre-
18. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441, 445-46 (1954).
19. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
20. Id. 181 P_.2d at 137.
21. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 847 (1949).
22. Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, 146 (1962).
23. See complete list of supporting authorities In Appendix, sub: Consideration of Re-
gional Needs, infra.
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hensive zoning in Euclid v. Ambler, a complete lack of any relation
to the advancement of these objects must, necessarily, invalidate
an ordinance. Thus, in several cases where the courts have found
that an ordinance did not promote these necessary goals, or where
the ordinance was even counter-productive of these goals, they have
often invalidated the ordinance.
The leading case for this proposition is the U. S. Supreme Court
case of Nectow v. City of Cambridge.2 4 In Nectow the plaintiff con-
ceded the constitutionality of the ordinance in its general applica-
tion. However, he argued, that as it applied in particular to his
property, it did nothing to advance the health, safety, convenience
or general welfare of the city.
The plaintiff's lot was restricted to residential use only. Although
the land faced residential areas across streets on two sides, it was
a corner lot and joined totally unrestricted properties on the other
two sides. A court-appointed master had found and the trial court
had adopted his findings that there was no public advantage in
drawing the line between residential and unrestricted use between
contiguous properties rather than across a public street. The Supreme
Court affirmed this finding and invalidated the ordinance.
Pennsylvania has, since then, taken the lead in defining public
welfare-what is and is not in the public welfare and what sorts of
zoning motives are not in the interest of public health, safety and
welfare.
The leading case in Pennsylvania is National Land and Invest-
ment Co. v. Kohn.25 In National Land the court struck down that
portion of a zoning ordinance which established a minimum lot size
of four acres. The municipality argued that a four acre minimum
was necessary to protect the ground water supplies from contami-
nation by on-site sewer systems, that the roads were only adequate
for fire protection with lots of four acres or more and that a four
acre minimum was necessary to preserve open spaces for a more
attractive environment.
The court rejected all three arguments. It rejected the sewage
disposal argument on the grounds that it had not been a factor in
consideration of the ordinance by the township and that the pur-
ported problem could be dealt with directly by sanitary regulations
rather than indirectly through restrictive zoning.
The court likewise rejected the argument that existing roads
were inadequate for less than four acre development. It noted that
under projected one acre development the roads would be adequate
for ten more years.-Even so, the court said, public good cannot be
24. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
25. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966).
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found in a desire to limit natural growth. If natural growth necessi-
tates expensive capital improvements, then it is in the public interest
to make such improvements, but not to attempt to avoid making
them.
The court saw the public welfare as encompassing a larger
public than just the township:
It is not difficult to envision the tremendous hardship,
as well as the chaotic conditions, which would result if all the
townships in this area decided to deny to a growing popula-
tion sites for residential development within the means of
at least a significant segment of the people.2 6
Finafly, the court rejected preservation of open spaces as a
legitimate zoning object. Although most residents were probably
desirous of preserving open spaces and in that sense the ordinance
might be in the public interest,, the court ruled that aesthetics, per se,
did "not rise to the level of public welfare". 27 Rather, it is largely
a matter of private concern, legitimately to be achieved by private
means.
Perhaps this idea was best expressed by Justice Bell in his dis-
sent in an earlier Pennsylvania case which had upheld a one acre
minimum, Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment of East-
town Township: 28
An owner of land may constitutionally make his property
as large and as private or secluded or exclusive as he de-
sires and his purse can afford. He may, for example, singly
or with his neighbors, purchase sufficient neighboring land to
protect and preserve by restrictions in deeds or by covenants
inter se, the privacy, a minimum acreage, the quiet, peace-
ful atmosphere and the tone and character of the community
which existed when he or they moved there. But Govern-
ment, as such, or through any of its local agencies, possesses
no such right .... [I]t can take land for a proper public use
by purchase or by eminent domain proceedings and then only
by paying just compensation therefore as required by the
Constitution.2 9 (emphasis, Justice Bell's).
It might be noted that this is not necessarily irreconcilable with
the Hawaii Diamond Motors case, for the economy of Hawaii is
uniquely dependent on the aesthetic character of the islands.
In a recent case regarding minimum lot requirements, Appeal
26. Id. 215 A.2d at 610.
27. Id. 215 A.2d at 611.
28. 893 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
29. Id. 141, A.2d at 867.
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of Kit-Mar Builders, ° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also invali-
dated an ordinance requiring a minimum lot size of two acres. "Ab-
sent some extraordinary justification," said the court, "a zoning
ordinance with minimum lot sizes such as those in this case is
completely unreasonable."'
In another recent Pennsylvania case, Appeal of Community
College of Delaware County,3 2 the court ruled that potential traffic
and sewerage problems were inadequate grounds on which to ex-
clude a college if alternative ways were available to handle the
problems. The case involved a refusal to grant a variance from a
zoning ordinance and the court ordered the variance granted.
VII. FAILURE TO PERMIT REASONABLE USES IN THE MU-
NICIPALITY
Pennsylvania has also taken the lead against zoning ordinances
which fail to provide at all for reasonable uses of property. Na-
tional Land v. Kohn is also a leading case on this proposition. In
National Land, the court took judicial notice of the inability of many
families to afford large lots and the resultant need for more lots
of moderate size. The smaller lot was a reasonable use, not of-
fensive to the public health, safety or welfare and not sufficiently
available elsewhere in the area.
Citing its holding in National Land, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated a complete ban on multi-family housing in Appeal
of Girsch.'3 The municipality, Nather Providence Township, had re-
stricted its residential development to single-family dwellings only
and had refused to grant a variance for construction of two nine-
story luxury apartment buildings. The court noted that many fami-
lies were, for one reason or another, limited in choice of home to
apartments. Since the ordinance operated to exclude people who
wished to live in the township, but could not because of the un-
availability of multi-family units, the ordinance was held to be
unreasonable. The opinion suggested, however, that this rationale
would not apply with equal force against restrictions of industrial
uses, since the central issue was the right of people to live where
they wish to live.
In a case very similar factually to National Land, the Virginia
Supreme Court invalidated a minimum lot size of two acres on the
grounds that it operated to exclude low income persons, thereby
advancing private, not public needs.3 4 The gist of that opinion, and
30. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
31. Id. 268 A.2d at 767.
32. 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
93. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
34. Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d
390 (1959).
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others like it, is that a zoning body has an obligation to provide
space somewhere for all reasonable and decent modes of residential
construction.
The New Jersey court has been less receptive to this idea. In
the Vickers case, the New Jersey court, upheld a complete ban on
mobile homes in a township which permitted business, agricul-
tural and industrial uses. In his dissent in Vickers, Justice Hall ar-
gued that the ordinance had the effect of excluding from the com-
munity a significant portion of the population who, because of lower
income and other reasons, live in mobile homes. There was, in his
view, no justification for this restriction, since the township was
large and had room for every conceivable use without confronta-
tion of incompatible uses.
Kunzler v. Hoffman,3 5 a subsequent New Jersey case, approaches
the same problem from a different direction. In Kunzler, a number
of land owners objected to a decision to grant a variance for the
construction of a 90-bed hospital for short duration in-patient care
of the mentally ill. The zoning ordinance specifically excluded hos-
pitals for contagious diseases and for the insane.
Although this decision is only collaterally relevant to the issue
of zoning reasonableness, it is significant that the court emphasized
the severe shortage state-wide of in-patient mental facilities as justi-
fication for the granting of the variance. While it is obvious that re-
fusal to grant a variance would not be unreasonable merely because
a decision to grant one is reasonable, the opinion of the court sug-
gests in its full context that zoning must be judged as reasonable
or unreasonable in the light of area-wide needs and the availability
elsewhere of land for a prohibited use.
VIII. ORDINANCES DETRIMENTAL TO EXISTING USES
A third basis relied upon by at least two courts, New Jersey
and Illinois, to strike down zoning ordinances -is that a permitted
use may be detrimental to the existing uses in the area.
In Cresskill v. Dumont, the borough of Dumont had re-zoned,
from residential to business, a parcel of land immediately adja-
cent to exclusively residential sections of the boroughs of Haworth,
Cresskill and Demarest. The court ruled that the ordinance was
unreasonable because it operated to the detriment of the residential
properties in Haworth, Cresskill and Demarest and did not result
in an off-setting benefit to the public welfare.
In Forbes v. Hubbard,3 6 an Illinois case, the court also invali-
dated a zoning ordinance, based in part upon a detriment to adja-
35. 48 N.J. 277, 225 A..2d 321 (1966).
36. 348 IlL 166. 180 N.E. 767 (1932).
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cent properties. The land in question was zoned residential by the
municipality of River Forest, Illinois, and was located on the inter-
section of two arterial streets. Across the street to the north in River
Forest the property was a non-conforming commercial use. Across
the street to the east and northeast was commercial property, zoned
commercial, in the municipality of Oak Park. Adjoining it to the
west were established residential single-family properties.
The court based its opinion in large part upon the detrimental
effect that development of the land as residential would have upon
the existing residential properties to the west. Expert testimony
at trial had established that if zoned residential, the property would
develop as substandard residential property and that the effect of
this would be more detrimental to the adjoining residential prop-
erties than if it were zoned and exploited for commercial uses.
IX. THE EXCESSIVE DIMINUTION RULE
Forbes v. Hubbard is also a leading case for the last of the four
propositions relied upon by the courts to invalidate unreasonably re-
strictive zoning ordinances. That proposition is that a zoning ordi-
nance which operates to destroy the greater portion of the value of
a landowner's property may be invalid for that reason alone, even
though it might promote the public health, safety or general wel-
fare. This might be called the excessive diminution rule for lack
of a better word.
In Forbes the court held that the plaintiff's property was wholly
unsuited for the residential use to which it was restricted since com-
mercial property faced it on two heavily traveled arterial streets.
Despite the fact that the adjacent property to the rear was resi-
dential, the court found that the property's use was much more
closely related to the commercial enterprises which it faced across
the streets to the north and east. Because of these factors the court
determined that the zoning ordinance was more than merely regu-
latory; it amounted to an uncompensated public taking.
The point seems to be that the government can exercise the
power of eminent domain to promote legitimate objects of public
welfare. There is, therefore, no need for the government to achieve
its purposes through regulation which amounts to an uncompen-
sated taking of the plaintiff's property.
In Dowey v. Village of Kensington 7 the New York Court of
Appeals also took this position. The case is similar to Forbes in that
the plaintiff's property had been zoned residential, although it faced
commercial property across a major arterial road. The village of
37. 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
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Kensington had zoned all the property within its limits for residential
or municipal uses including the plaintiff's property along the road.
The court found that the ordinance did promote the public wel-
fare in that it protected the village from the encroachment of com-
mercial uses incompatible with the residential nature of the com-
munity. However strong the public need for a buffer against the
traffic and commercial strip. along the road, the court held that this
purpose could not be accomplished at the expense of the plaintiff's
property rights:
Certainly an ordinance is unreasonable which restricts prop-
erty upon the boundary of the village to a use for which the
property is not adapted, and thereby destroys the greater
part of its value in order that the beauty of the village as a
whole may be enhanced. 8
In Chusrud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington,8 9 another New
York case, the court held that it did not matter that the plaintiff had
purchased the property with knowledge of the restrictions placed
upon it by the zoning ordinance. Chusrud involved the same ordinance
apparently as Dowsey and a parcel of land adjacent to the and in-
volved in Dowsey. The court ruled that such a zoning ordinance
could be invalid on the basis of excessive diminution in value, de-
spite a lack of showing of personal loss by the plaintiff; that exces-
sive diminution could still apply because the zoning operated against
the land without reference to its ownership.
X. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to briefly outline the theories which
courts in several states have relied upon to invalidate provisions in
comprehensive zoning statutes.
Comprehensive zoning developed in response to the many abuses
inherent in uncontrolled urban growth. Courts have generally granted
zoning boards a virtual carte blanche. The result has been wide-
spread abuse, especially by suburban communities, in the form of
restrictive and exclusionary zoning laws. These laws often operate
to aggravate exisitng problems of public health, safety and general
welfare in neighboring municipalities or in adjacent unincorporated
areas. These results are counter-productive to the purposes of com-
prehensive zoning.
In the areas where abuse has been most widespread, the ju-
diciary has invalidated zoning ordinances. The cases appear to be
based on at least four distinct rationales. First: zoning has been
38. Id. 177 N.E. at 480.
89. 22 App. Div.2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1964).
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invalidated when it does not promote the public health, safety or
general welfare. Second: it has been invalidated when it does not
provide for reasonable and needed uses, especially for residential
uses. Third: It has been invalidated when it establishes a use detri-
mental to existing uses. Finally: zoning has been invalidated when
it results in an excessive diminution of property value, even when
it has legitimately promoted the public health, safety or general
welfare.
As an overriding consideration, an increasing number of courts
are demanding that municipalities consider the regional impact of
their zoning power. Courts are increasingly ignoring the political
boundaries that divide neighboring municipalities and are consider-
ing the impact of zoning ordinances upon the entire economic com-
munity.
Yet in zoning, as in most things, there are two sides to the coin.
Aesthetics, noise abatement and traffic control are often cited as
justification for restrictive zoning plans.
In order to invalidate unreasonably restrictive zoning laws, the
courts are often forced to reject these desirable goals. Other courts
have gone the other way and have decided that the aesthetics alone
fully justify the exercise of zoning power.
The courts are often given the task of choosing between the
lesser of two evils. Often the deciding factor is not a more persuasive
doctrine of law, but the more compelling fact situation. Thus, no
logical pattern of decisions is discernible. As Fred G. Stickel said
in his 1969 report to NIMLO:
It would seem the more one reads and analyzes decisions
in this field of municipal law the more it becomes apparent
that one can find equally convincing precedent on both sides
of any issue with a result largely dependent upon how a par-
ticular court in a particular locale views the particular set
of facts in the case at hand. 40
Let it suffice to say in closing that the cases set forth in this ar-
ticle, while not universal in their application, are a source of well-
reasoned precedent upon which municipal zoning enactments can be
challenged when the equities justify a legal remedy.
40. 32 NIMLO Mun. L. Rev. 412, 432 (1969).
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APPENDIX
The leading cases standing for the propositions dealt with in the article are
set out below according to topic. Several cases not mentioned in the paper are
included. In several cases it is noted that the dissent advanced the proposition,
rather than the majority.
Consideration of Regional Needs:
Appeal of Kit Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959).
County Commissioners of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228
A.2d 450 (1962).
Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347 (1949).
Forbes v. Hubbard et a., 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932).
Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn et al., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965), rehearing denied, 215 A.2d 597 (1966).
Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th cir. 1955).
Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township et al., 37 N.J. 232,
181 A.2d 129 (1962). Dissenting opinion.
Lack of Public Purpose:
Appeal of Community College of Delaware County, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641
(1969).
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, supra.
Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township, 393
Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). Dissenting opinion.
National Land v. Kohnt, supra.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Exclusion of Reasonable Uses:
Appeal of Joseph Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, supra.
Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, supra.
Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 225 A.2d 321 (1966).
Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, supra. Dissenting opinion.
National Land v. Kohn, supra.
Vickers v. Township Committee, supra. Dissenting opinion.
Detriment to Existing Uses:
Borough of Cresskill et al v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441
(1954).
Forbes v. Hubbard, supra.
Excessive Diminution of Value:
Chusrud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1964).
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington et al., 257 N.Y. 211, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
Forbes v. Hubbard, supra.
Huttig v. City of Richmond -eights, supra.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, supra.
